South Carolina Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 11

Summer 2013

In Pursuit of a Remedy: A Need for Reform of Police Officer
Liability
Bonnie E. Bull

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bonnie E. Bull, In Pursuit of a Remedy: A Need for Reform of Police Officer Liability, 64 S. C. L. Rev. 1015
(2013).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Bull: In Pursuit of a Remedy: A Need for Reform of Police Officer Liabi

IN PURSU T OF A REMEDY:
A NEED FOR REFORM OF POLICE OFFICER LIABILITY
1.

INTRODUCTION

....................................

I.

BACKGROUND: SOUTH CAROLINA TORT CLAIMS ACT..................... 1018

111.

STATE AND FEDERAL CLAIMS: A COMPARISON .................................... 1020

4. State Law Claims ..........
1. Gross Negligence Standard
2. Qualified Immunity
B. FederalClaims .................
1. FourthAmendmente
2. FourteenthAmendment

.............
.......
......

........... 1015

1020
.............. 1021
1023
1024
1025
1027

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND FEDERAL LAW: AN
UNJUSTBURDEN
................................................... 1030

A.

Effect of Current Case Law and the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act
.....
1030
B. The Intent Requirement
.............
103 1
C. The Sliding Scale of Liability in State Law Claims: A Conundrum
for the Courts
..............
1032

V.

CHASING CHANGE: SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM IN SOUTH CAROLINA .... 1034

VI. CONCLUSION

1.

.............................................. 1036

INTRODUCTION

According to FBI statistics, innocent bystanders account for 42% of fatalities
in high-speed police pursuits.
Despite this staggering percentage, innocent
bystanders face an almost insurmountable challenge to recovering from police
departments for injuries or death.2 This class of bystanders includes, aion
others, minor passengers in a vehicle being pursued and pedestrians.

I. David P. Schultz et al., Evidence-Based Decisions on Police Pursuits: The Officer's
Perspective, FBI L. ENTORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 2010, at 1, 1-2 (quoting John Hill, High-Speed
Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction, FBI L. ENTORCEMCENT BULL., July 2002,
at 14, 15).
2.
See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 856 (1998) (applying a "shocks
the conscience" standard for Fourteenth Amendment claims involving police pursuits and finding
the standard was not met).
3.
See, e.g., id. at 836 (passenger on motorcycle); Meals v. City of Memphis, 493 F.3d 720,
723 (6th Cir. 2007) (minor passenger); Helseth v. Burch, 258 F.3d 867, 869 (8th Cir. 2001)
(juvenile passenger); Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1035 (1st Cir. 1996) (pedestrian); Jones v.
City of Durham, 622 S.E.2d 596, 598 (N.C. 2005) (pedestrian) see also Anna M. Krstulic, Note,
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Furthermore, the number of bystanders killed or maimed as a result of police
pursuits may be significantly higher than the available statistics suggest.4
Innocent-bystander fatalities and injuries remain an underreported portion of
police pursuit statistics for two reasons: (1) most agencies do not report deaths
that occur after the chase has ended, even if it is a matter of seconds or if the
bystander dies at the hospital, and (2) there is no mandatory nationwide system
-6
of reporting police pursuit statistics.
Experts report that a majority of police pursuits were initiated following a
traffic violation. As many as 27% of suspects, interviewed as part of a grant
study, reported that they failed to stop for police simply because of a suspended
license.8 However, despite the high social costs, in terms of loss of life, medical
expenses, and increased criminal charges against the suspect, police pursuits still
enjoy widespread public support for several reasons.
First, the sensationalism of these chases in the media has lead to a near
fascination with police pursuits.9 In 1994, millions watched a white Bronco
proceed down the highways of Los Angeles carrying its notorious driver, O.J.
Simpson. 10 Television shows, such as Cops, frequently involve vehicle chases of
low-level criminals on urban streets.
Many action movies involve a police
chase that results in the protagonist getting away at the expense of an untold
number of bystanders.12 Thousands of people sit anxiously in their theater seats
hoping that the character gets away, despite the carnage that often ensues.

America's lost Shocking Standard: WIhen Inn ocnt Parties Are Injured or Killed in High-Speed
Police Pursuits, 4iat Police Conduct Sufficiently "Shocks the Conscience" to Allow Recovery?, 47
WASHBURN L.J. 785, 786 (2008) (citing Hill, supra note 1, at 14-15) (stating that in 1998, 114
"innocent bystanders" were killed in police pursuits).
4.
See Hill, supra note 1. at 15 ("[A]ttempts by NH-TSA to track pursuit fatalities . . . results
in the collection of as little as one-half of the actual data.") (citing D.P. Van Blaricom. He FleesTo Pursue or Not to That Is the Ouestion, POLICE MAG. (Nov. 1, 1998), http://www.police
mag.con/channel/patrol/articles/1998/11 he-flees-to-pursue-or-not-to-that-is-the-question.aspx).
5.
See Interview by Jim Phillips with Geoffrey Alpert, Professor, Univ. of S.C. (2003).
availableat http://pursuitwatch.org/stories/alpert.htm.
6.
See Larry Copeland, Chases by Police Yield High Fatalities,U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 23, 2010 at
3A.

7.
See Schultz et al., supra note 1, at I (quoting Hill, supra note I, at 15).
8. Id. at 2. ("[Thirty-two percent] were driving a stolen car, 27 percent had a suspended
driver's license. 27 percent wanted to avoid arrest, and 21 percent were driving under the
influence . . . .").

9.
See, e.g., Interview by Jim Phillips with Geoffrey Alpert, supra note 5 ("Police pursuits
have attracted the attention of the public through the media, entertainment industry, and personal
experiences.... Live broadcasts of pursuits may satisfy the appetites of those who need the
excitement of risk and danger.").
10. See Seth Mydans, CorneredatHis House After He Is Accused of Killing Ex-W ife and Her
Friend,N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1994, at 1.
11. See. e.g., Cops: Police Chases Special Edition (FOX television broadcast Nov. 18, 2006)
(documenting Florida police officers chasing a male who stole a vehicle, among other chases).
12. See Patrick T. O'Connor & William L. Norse, Jr., Police Pursuits: A Comprehensive
Look at the Broad Spectrum of Police Pursuit Liability and Law, 57 MIRCER L. REV. 511. 513
(2006).
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Society's exposure to police pursuits in such a sensational light has desensitized
many to the effects and costs of these chases on the general public.1
Second, despite the ramifications of these chases, the public and officers do
not want the suspects to remain at large.14 Fear of repeat offenders and
prevailing ideas of justice have led society to accept the deaths of innocent
bystanders as a byproduct of the necessity of police pursuits.15 The main goal of
effective law enforcement is "to apprehend and arrest the suspect."16 The United
States Supreme Court has given great weight to the need to promote law
enforcement interests, even though there is often a great cost to the individual
and society.
A few states and police agencies have instituted more restrictive pursuit
policies.' 8 A report on the Miami Metro-Dade Police Department indicated that
a restrictive chase policy decreased the number of chases in one year from 279 to
51.19 However, the overwhelming majority of police departments in South
Carolina have not implemented restrictive chase policies, 0 which leads to the
very real possibility of liability for injuries resulting from police pursuits.
In federal court, injured innocent bystanders currently must satisfy a
rigorous, if not impossible, standard for § 1983 claims, and this standard is

13. See, e.g., Bill Mears, Supreme Court Weighs Police Action in 100 mph Chase, CNN (Feb.
28, 2007, 11:51 AM), http:/www.cn.com/2007/LAW/102/26/police.chases/index.html (quoting
Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (No. 05-1631),
http://Iwww.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument transcripts/05-1631.pdt) (indicating that
media affects the Supreme Court in police pursuit cases and noting that Justice Antonin Scalia
stated in oral arguments, "[The officer] created the scariest chase I ever saw since 'The French
Connection. ').
14. See, e.g.. Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., The ConstitutionalImplications ofHigh-Speed Police
Pursuits Under a Substantive Due Process Analysis: Homeward Through the Haze, 27 U. MEM. L.
REv. 599, 606 (1997) ("[M]any police officials still believe that the injuries and deaths caused by
pursuits are worth the value of pursuing law violators.").
15. See generally id. ("[O]fficers and citizens who view the primary police mission as the
apprehension of law violators tend to emotionally defend pursuit driving and its role in that
mission.").
16. Schultz et al., supra note 1. at 2.
17. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007) ("Couldn't the innocent public
equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had simply
ceased their pursuit? We think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best.");
Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000) ("Indeed, the Fourth Amendment accepts [the risk
that officers may stop innocent people in a Terry stop] in connection with more drastic police
action."); Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis. 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998) ("Prudence ... was subject to
countervailing enforcement considerations, and while [the officer] exaggerated their demands, there
is not reason to believe that they were tainted by an improper or malicious motive on his part.").
18. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert, Police Pursuit: Policies and Training, NAT'L INST. JUST.
RES. BRIEF, May 1997, at 1. 4 & tbl.2, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/164831.pdf ("When MetroDade adopted a 'violent felony only' pursuit policy . . . the number of pursuits decreased 82 percent
the following year.").
19. See id. at 4 tbl.2.
20. Interview with Wesley K. Cook, Chief of Police, Town of Eutawville, S.C. (Mar. 24,
2013).
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inequitable based on the word "intent" and the "judicial conscience."a This
Note suggests that, under current South Carolina and federal law, it is easier and
more probable for a fleeing suspect, who was harmed in a police pursuit, to
recover than it is for an innocent bystander to receive complete or partial
recovery. Current South Carolina law should be reformed to allow for complete
recovery for innocent bystanders harmed as a result of high-speed police chases
to comport with traditional notions of fairness and equality.
Part II of this Note describes current county and municipal liability under the
South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Part III discuses claims in South Carolina
courts, analyzes current United States Supreme Court standards applicable to
federal claims brought in state court, and examines the reasoning employed by
the courts for limiting police department liability. Part IV analyzes the interplay
of the impact of the courts' standards and the application of the South Carolina
Tort Claims Act. Part V offers recommendations and suggestions for changes in
South Carolina law. Part VI concludes this Note.

11. BACKGROUND: SOUTH CAROLINA TORT CLAIMS ACT
Enacted in 1986, the South Carolina Tort Claims Act22 provides the state, as
well as its political subdivisions and employees, immunity from tortious liability
for occurrences within the scope of official state duties, subject to exceptions
that waive such immunity.24 The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reiterated
this purpose, finding that "[t]he Act does not create a cause of action. Rather, it
removes the common law bar of sovereign immunity in certain
circumstances .... "25
With regard to the claims of innocent bystanders, concern lies with three
main provisions of the Tort Claims Act: the exceptions to the waiver of
immunity, 26 the statutory cap on damages 27 and the exclusive and sole remedy
provision. 8 First, section 15-78-60 of the South Carolina Code provides the
exceptions to immunity, which limit the applicability of sovereign immunity to

21. See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 856 (applying the "shocks the [judicial] conscience" standard
for Fourteenth Amendment claims involving police pursuits and finding the standard was not met);
Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo. 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (holding that the Fourth Amendment seizure
standard for police pursuits is "means intentionally applied").
22. South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (2005 & Supp.
2012).
23. See id § 15-78-60 (listing forty exceptions to the statutory waiver of immunity,
including, for example, legislative or judicial action, exercise of discretion of a government
employee, a nuisance, and natural conditions on a public way).
24. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20(b) (2005).
25. Bayle v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 344 S.C. 115, 121, 542 S.E.2d 736. 739 (Ct. App. 2001)
(citing Summers v. Harrison Constr., 298 S.C. 451, 454, 381 S.E.2d 493, 495 (Ct. App. 1989)).
26. § 15-78-60.
27. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (2005).
28. See id § 15-78-200.
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the state and its actors.
Of the forty exceptions listed, subsection (5) is a
relevant and frequently invoked exception to municipal liability for police
pursuits 30 Under subsection (5). police departments are not liable for losses
resulting from "the exercise of discretion or judgment by the [officer] or the
performance or failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or
judgment of the governmental entity or [officer]." 3 1 Section 15-78-60 highlights
the importance that the element of duty plays in determining whether liability or
immunity exists in a particular case.3
The duty of care is analyzed under
common law standards, and once the other elements of negligence are
established, the court's next step is "to analyze the applicability of exceptions to
the waiver of immunity."
The second applicable provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act is
section 15-78-120, which limits the liability and provides the statutory cap on
recovery for claims against county and municipal police departments.
A single
loss or occurrence, such as a collision resulting from a high-speed police chase,
cannot lead to more than $300,000 in damages for the victim.35 This provision
also prohibits recovery for punitive damages, exemplary damages, and interest
prior to judgment, no matter how egregious the injury suffered as a result of the
officer's conduct while in the scope of his duties. 6 The statutory cap and the
prohibition on punitive damages, in effect, function so as to eliminate any
equitable factors the court or jury may consider in awarding recovery. Any
judgment, even if it is $3.75 million, awarded against a county or municipality
must be reduced to the statutory cap. 37 leaving it tip to the injured victim's
insurance to possibly cover the remaining costs associated with the victim's
injuries.
Finally, section 15-78-200 states that the Tort Claims Act is the "exclusive
and sole remedy for any tort committed by a [police officer] while acting within

29. See § 15-78-60.
30. See, e.g., Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 386, 608 S.E.2d 573, 578
(2005) (quoting § 15-78-60(5)) (citing Pike v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 343 S.C 224, 230, 540 S.E.2d
87. 90 (2000); Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36, 46, 492 S.E.2d 55, 60 (1997); Niver v. S.C. Dep't
of Highways & Pub. Transp., 302 S.C. 461, 463, 395 S.E.2d 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1990)) (discussing
whether the subsection should be applied).
31. § 15-78-60(5).
32. See id.
33. Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 142, 638 S.E.2d 650, 660
(2006) (citing § 15-78-60; Trousdell v. Cannon, 351 S.C. 636, 642, 572 S.E.2d 264, 267 (2002);
Arthurs ex rel. Estate of Munn v. Aiken Cnty., 346 S.C. 97, 105. 551 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2001)).
34. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (2005).
35. See § 15-78-120(a)(1).
36. See § 15-78-120(b).
37. See Clark v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 381, 608 S.E.2d 573, 575-76 (2005)
(noting that jury returned a $3.75 million verdict for the plaintiffs and that Department's liability

was subsequently reduced to $250,000.).
38. See generally S.C. CODE AN\,. § 38-71-10 (2002) (providing that accident insurers are
entitled to pay for healthcare services).
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the scope of the [officer's] official duties."3 9 The General Assembly also
provided the courts with guidance in interpreting the statute, requiring that any
inferences or ambiguities be construed liberally "in favor of limiting the liability
of the governmental entity." 40 This guidance leaves the courts with little doubt
of the intent of the General Assembly as to the purposes behind the enactment of
the Tort Claims Act. The Editor's Notes to this provision go further in stating
that the intent is to allow the government to be liable for a reasonable amount
only as expressly provided for in the Tort Claims Act.'
These three provisions of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act are the
foundational principles guiding the courts in determining county and municipal
liability for high-speed police pursuits. Part IV of this Note will show how these
provisions work together to prevent complete recovery for innocent bystanders
injured by county and municipal police officers.
III. STATE AND FEDERAL CLAIMS: A COMPARISON

It is important to examine the distinction between claims brought under state
law and those brought tinder federal law, or a combination of the two, to show
how the law creates a loophole allowing fleeing felons to recover when innocent
bystanders cannot. State law claims in South Carolina are based on a gross
negligence standard 42 while the federal law standard depends on the
constitutional amendment relied upon by the plaintiff in a § 1983 action.4 3
A.

State Law Claims

In Clark v. South Carolina Department of Public Safty. 44 the South
Carolina Supreme Court addressed the liability of a police department for the
death of an innocent bystander.45 In Clark, a state trooper attempted a traffic
stop following the driver of a van's erratic behavior.46 The van failed to stop and
a pursuit ensued. 7 After briefly stopping during the pursuit, the driver of the
van attempted to run over the trooper, and the chase resumed.48 The van's driver
also ran through a red light, almost crashing into another vehicle.49 The trooper

39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-200 (2005).
40. Id.
41. Id. at editor's note.
42. See Clark. 362 S.C. at 383. 608 S.E.2d at 576.
43. Compare Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (Fourth Amendment
liability applies a "means intentionally applied" standard), with Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 855 (1998) (Fourteenth Amendment liability applies a "shocks the conscience" standard).
44. 362 S.C. 377, 608 S.E.2d 573.
45. See id. at 381. 608 S.E.2d at 575-76.
46. See id. at 383, 608 S.E.2d at 577.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 383-84, 608 S.E.2d at 577.
49. See id. at 384. 608 S.E.2d at 577.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss4/11

6

Bull: In Pursuit of a Remedy: A Need for Reform of Police Officer Liabi
TORT LAW

2013]

1021

radioed to dispatch and his supervisor that the trooper believed a crash was
imminent; however, he did not abandon pursuit of the vehicle.io While traveling
approximately eighty miles per hours, the driver of the van attempted to pass
another vehicle in the emergency lane and swerved, crashing head-on into Amy
Clark's car. Clark died at the scene of the accident . The accident occurred
within five to six miles of the North Carolina border, at which point the trooper
would have been forced to terminate the pursuit.
Amy Clark's father, as personal representative of the estate, brought a
wrongful death claim against the driver of the fleeing vehicle and the South
Carolina Department of Public Safety,54 the agency that oversees the South
Carolina Highway Patrol . At trial, the jury awarded Clark $3.75 million and
apportioned 80% fault to the driver of the fleeing vehicle and 20% fault to the
South Carolina Department of Public Safety.
This apportionment left the
Department with a $750,000 verdict, which the trial court subsequently reduced
to $250,000 in accordance with the limit of the Tort Claims Act at the time the
trial commenced.
The Department appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.58 The South Carolina Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review five issues on appeal by the Department. 59 This Note
will focus on two of the issues-the gross negligence standard and qualified
immunity.
1. Gross Negligence Standard
On appeal, the Department alleged that the court of appeals erred in holding
that the trial court properly instructed the jury that gross negligence is the
standard of care law enforcement officers owe in pursuits.6 0 The legal duty that
police officers owe to the public at large is established in section 56-5-760,
which allows officers "to exceed the maximum speed limit and to disregard
certain traffic violations during a police pursuit."6 1However, the statute goes on

50. See id. at 383. 384. 608 S.E.2d at 577.
51. See id. at 384 608 S.E.2d at 577.
52. See id. at 381, 608 S.E.2d at 575.
53. See id. at 385. 608 S.E.2d at 578.
54. See id. at 381. 608 S.E.2d at 575.
55. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-6-20 (2007) (establishing that the South Carolina Highway
Patrol is a division of the South Carolina Department of Public Safety).
56. See Clark. 362 S.C. at 381. 608 S.E.2d at 575-76.
57. See id at 381, 608 S.E.2d at 576. The Tort Claims Act has been amended to raise the
statutory cap to $300,000 since the time of the Clark trial. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120
(2005).
58. Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 353 S.C. 291. 312. 578 S.E.2d 16. 26 (Ct. App. 2002)
affd 362 S.C. 377, 608 S.E.2d 573 (2005).
59. See Clark, 362 S.C. at 380-81, 608 S.E.2d at 575-76.
60. See id. at 382. 608 S.E.2d at 576.
61. Clark. 353 S.C. at 299. 578 S.E.2d at 20 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-760(B) (2006)).
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to state that these allowances "do not relieve the [police officer] from the duty to
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons."2 The court of appeals noted
that the parties agreed to the gross negligence standard. but the court sugested
an argument could be made for an ordinary negligence standard as well. Both
the supreme court and the court of appeals noted that because the parties agreed
to this standard of care, it would be the rule of the case. but seemed to suggest
that this standard may be open to a different interpretation in future cases.64
According to the trial court, gross negligence is "the failure to exercise a
slight degree of care.
The court of appeals also indicated that the South
Carolina Supreme Court previously defined gross negligence as "the intentional,
conscious failure to do something which is incumbent upon one to do or the
doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do"
The supreme court
found that the trial court's definition of gross negligence was consistent with
South Carolina law.67
Turning to the question of whether sufficient evidence existed to support a
verdict that the trooper was grossly negligent in continuing to pursue the fleeing
vehicle, the supreme court found that "the evidence ... could yield a finding of
gross negligence."68 Both the supreme court and the court of appeals heavily
relied upon three key pieces of evidence in determining that sufficient evidence
existed for a jury to find gross negligence on behalf of the trooper.69 First,
Clark's expert witness, an experienced law enforcement officer and expert in
high-speed pursuits, testified that the trooper should have terminated the pursuit
because it was clear the fleeing driver was not going to stop.70 Also, the expert
stated that in order for an officer to meet the standard of care necessary in
pursuits, the officer must continuously "weigh the danger of apprehending the

62. Id (quoting § 56-5-760(D)).
63. See id at 300 & n1.7. 578 S.E.2d at 20 & n1.7. The South Carolina Court of Appeals noted
that there is a split among jurisdictions whether the language of § 56-5-760 creates ain ordinary
negligence standard. See id. at 300 n.7, 578 S.E.2d at 20 n.7. Further, the court stated that the
legislature deleted the "reckless conduct" standard of § 56-5-760 and there is no mention of "gross
negligence" in the statute. See id However, counsel did not raise the issue on appeal. See id.
64. See Clark, 362 S.C. at 382 & n.2, 608 S.E.2d at 576 & n.2.
65. Id. at 382, 608 S.E.2d at 576 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Clark. 353 S.C. at 301, 578 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice,
350 S.C. 315, 331, 566 S.E.2d 536. 544 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also
noted that the definition of gross negligence includes "the failure to exercise the slightest care" and
that it has been defined as "the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances." Id
(citing Faile, 350 S.C. at 331-32, 566 S.E.2d at 544; Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410. 415, 70
S.E.2d 629, 631 (1952)). Although a technical distinction, the differences in the two definitions
could be quite profound. The "conscious failure" language could be interpreted more similarly to
"reckless conduct" than the "absence of care." However, in the Clark case, the differing definitions
did not weigh heavily on the result and the court did not differentiate between them. See id
67. Clark, 362 S.C. at 382, 608 S.E.2dat 576.
68. Id. at 383, 608 S.E.2d at 577.
69. See id. at 385, 608 S.E.2d at 577-78 (quoting Clark, 353 S.C. at 302, 578 S.E.2d at 22).
70. See id. at 384. 608 S.E.2d at 577.
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subject against the danger the chase is creating."' Second, the trooper radioed
dispatch and indicated that he believed that a crash was imminent. The trooper
witnessed the fleeing vehicle almost hit several vehicles, drive at a high rate of
speed, run a red light, and attempt to pass vehicles in the emergency lane,
leading to this belief.
Finally, the supreme court relied on evidence that the
accident occurred within five or six miles of the North Carolina border, where
the trooper would have been required to terminate the pursuit.74
The supreme court compared this evidence with the applicable definitional
standards of gross negligence and determined that sufficient evidence existed for
a jury to return a verdict against the trooper for gross negligence. 5 The supreme
court affirmed the court of appeals, finding that the trial court did not err in
denying the Department's motion for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.76
2.

Qualified Immunity

The supreme court also addressed the issue of whether the discretionary
immunity provided in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act could protect the
trooper from liability.77 The Department raised the issue on appeal, contending
that the trooper was protected by discretionary immunity; however, the court of
appeals and the supreme court found that he was not protected.
The government carries the burden of proving the affirmative defense that
the conduct fits within an exception to the waiver of immunity.79 In order to
establish that the conduct fits within the discretionary immunity provided inder
section 15-78-60(5), the Department must prove that the officer "faced with
alternatives, actually weighed competing considerations and made a conscious
choice.,,s
Merely proving that the officer could exercise discretion is not
enough to qualify for discretionary immunity.81 Further, in weighing these

7 1. Id.
72. Id. at 385. 608 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting Clark, 353 S.C. at 303, 578 S.E.2d at 22) ("[T]he
Court of Appeals concluded that the 'heightened dangerousness of the pursuit was evidenced by
evidence [the trooper] notified the dispatcher he believed a crash was imminent.").
73. See id. at 383-84, 608 S.E.2d at 577.
74. See id. at 385. 608 S.E.2d at 578.
75. See id (citing Clark, 353 S.C. at 303, 578 S.E.2d at 22).
76. Id. at 382, 388, 608 S.E.2d at 576, 579.
77. See id. at 386. 608 S.E.2d at 578.
78. See id
79. See id (citing Niver v. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 302 S.C. 461, 463, 395
S.E.2d 728. 730 (Ct. App. 1990)); see also Washington v. Whitaker, 317 S.C. 108, 114. 451 S.E.2d
894, 898 (1994) ("[W]e overrule the antiquated rule that sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar
and, accordingly, cannot be waived. We ... hold that sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense
that must be pled.").

80. Id. (citing Pike v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 343 S.C 224, 230, 540 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2000)).
81. See id. (citing Summer v. Carpenter, 328 S.C. 36. 46. 492 S.E.2d 55, 60 (1997)).
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considerations, it must be shown that the officer "utilized accepted professional
standards appropriate to resolve the issue before [him]." 8
The court of appeals found that the initiation and continuation of a pursuit is
operational in nature and "not the type of discretionary act contemplated in the
Tort Claims Act."a The supreme court focused on weighing the conflicting
duties of a police officer, 84 and the court found that police officers have a duty to
apprehend criminals but that their "paramount duty is to protect the public."85
The court further found that conduct, such as pursuing fleeing drivers, is not
justified when such conduct subjects the public to unreasonable risks of injury.
The supreme court set striking precedent for future cases by holding that "a law
enforcement officer is not immune from liability under [s]ection 15-78-60(5) for
the decision on whether to begin or continue the immediate pursuit of a
suspect."87 Thus, the trooper's decision to begin and continue the pursuit,
despite the rapid and emotional decisionmaking that took place, could not be
protected by discretionary immunity under the Tort Claims Act.88
B. FederalClaims
Under federal law, the claim innocent bystanders typically present arises
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which establishes a civil action for deprivation of
rights. 89 Two essential elements make tip a § 1983 claim. 90 First, the innocent
bystander must prove that the officer who committed the conduct was acting
under the color of state law. 91 Second, the bystander must prove that such
conduct deprived the innocent bystander of "rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution."92 The second element must state with specificity
which right, privilege, or immunity has allegedly been violated, because § 1983
only provides a remedy, not a right.

82. Id. (citing Pike, 343 S.C at 230, 540 S.E.2d at 90).
83. Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 353 S.C. 291, 305, 578 S.E.2d 16, 23 (Ct. App. 2002).
84. See Clark, 362 S.C. at 386-87, 608 S.E.2d at 578-79.
85. Id. at 386-87. 608 S.E.2d at 578.
86. See id. at 387, 608 S.E.2d at 578-79.
87. Id. at 387, 608 S.E.2d at 579.
88. See id.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
90. See id.
91. See id.: see also Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan. 526 U.S. 40. 49-50 (1999)
('[R]espondents must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state
law.").
92. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
93. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266. 271 (1994) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979)) ("Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely
provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'"). Further, identifying the
"specific constitutional right allegedly infringed" in the plaintiffs complaint is the first step in
§ 1983 actions. Id. (citing Graham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386. 394 (1989): Baker, 443 U.S. at 140).
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In § 1983 actions, innocent bystanders typically claim a violation of their
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, or a combination of the two.94 Fourth
Amendment claims center on the premise of an unreasonable seizure, and
Fourteenth Amendment claims center on a violation of due process.95
1. FourthAmendment
The preeminent case on Fourth Amendment liability for injuries caused by
police pursuits is Brower v. County ofInyo.96 Although factually distinct in that
the Court was not presented with a claim by innocent bystanders, the standard
the Court established in Brower nevertheless applies to innocent-bystander
97
cases.
In Brower, the police pursued a stolen vehicle on a twenty-mile chase, which
resulted in the death of the driver of the fleeing vehicle.98 Brower alleged the
police strategically placed a tractor-trailer across a highway at night.99 Hidden
behind a blind curve, Brower further alleged the police aimed their headlights in
the direction of the oncoming vehicle in an effort to conceal the tractor-trailer. 00
The driver of the vehicle allegedly never saw the tractor-trailer, collided head-on
with it, and died as a result of the crash. 101
The driver's representative brought a § 1983 action, claiming a violation of
the driver's Fourth Amendment rights because the officers unreasonably seized
the driver by intentionally creating a roadblock meant to harm the driver. 102 The
district court found that "establishing a roadblock [was] not unreasonable under
the circumstances."'o The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
as a divided panel, affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a
claim by reasoning that no seizure had occurred.104

94. See Krstulic, supra note 3, at 790 (citing O'Connor & Norse, supra note 12, at 546).
95. See O'Connor & Norse, supra note 12, at 546; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law ..).
96. 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
97. See, e.g.. Cone v. Nettles. 308 S.C. 109, 113. 417 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1992) (citing Brower,
489 U.S. at 596-97) (applying the Brower standard to facts concerning a passenger killed as a result
of a police pursuit).
98. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 594.
99. See id. (citation omitted).
100. See id. (citation omitted).
101. See id. (citation omitted).
102. See id.
103. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. See Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 817 F.2d 540, 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 489 U.S. 593
(1989) ("Brower's seizure, if any, was the result of his own effort in avoiding numerous
opportunities to stop.").
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Writing for the majority of the United States Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
developed what is now known as the "means intentionally applied test." 10
Under the rule of Brower, a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs in police pursuits
"only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement
through means intentionally applied."106 In determining whether a driver or
bystander has been seized in a police pursuit, the Court does not inquire into an
officer's subjective intent, but "it [is] enough for a seizure that a person be
stopped by the very instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to
achieve that result.i"
Further, Justice Scalia explicitly pointed out that a
seizure would not occur when the government merely terminated freedom of
movement, such as the movement of an "innocent passerby." 1o The Supreme
Court found in Brower that a seizure occurred because the officers intended to
stop the fleeing driver by means of the roadblock. 109 The Court remanded the
case for a determination of whether the seizure was unreasonable. 0
Shortly after Brower, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue
of unreasonable seizures tinder the Fourth Amendment in an innocent-bystander
case. In Cone v. Nettles, II the police pursued a motorcycle on which the
plaintiff, then age sixteen, was a passenger. 11 The officer in pursuit noticed that
both the driver and the passenger looked young but continued pursuit, despite the
motorcycle traveling at a high speed.'
At 100 miles per hour, the driver of the
motorcycle lost control and seriously injured the passenger.11 4 The passenger
brought suit against a county deputy and a city police officer who were involved
in the pursuit, alleging a violation of Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C

§ 1983.

105. See Broier, 489 U.S. at 596-97.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 599.
108. See id. at 596-97.
109. See id. at 599 600.
110. Id. On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to resolve the issue of
unreasonableness, for the reason that this issue was not properly to be decided on a motion to
dismiss a claim. See Brower v. Cnty. of Invo, 884 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the
court of appeals did raise the question to be determined under the Tennessee v. Garnerstandard of
deadly force: "Did a reasonably non-deadly alternative exist for apprehending the suspect?" Id
(citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985)). The Court opined that this is a question of
fact because it "cannot be said with certainty that no non-deadly alternative existed." Id.
111. 308 S.C. 109, 417 S.E.2d 523 (1992).
112. See id. at 110, 417 S.E.2d at 524.
113. See id. Although the court did not expressly discuss the importance of this fact, it
appears the court noted it for two reasons. First, the court possibly tried to show that the officer
knew the young age and immaturity of the driver being pursued. Second, the court may have been
inferring that this observation is another reason the officer initiated the pursuit, because in South
Carolina, anyone under the age of 21 must wear a helmet on a motorcycle. Id. at n.I (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-5-3660 (2006)).
114. See id at 111. 417 S.E.2d at 524.
115. See id.
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On direct appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court approached the deputy
and the officer's liability differently under § 1983.116 Only "persons" can be
held liable inder 42 U.S.C. § 1983.117 The court found that the deputy was not a
"person" within § 1983 because he acted in his official capacity as a state
official. 8 The court further noted that the South Carolina Constitution
establishes the sheriff s office, and the General Assembly prescribes the duties of
sheriffs and their deputies. 119 Accordingly, the court reasoned that deputy
sheriffs are state officials.12 0 Therefore, the deputy was found not individually
liable in his official capacity.121
Turning to the city police officer, the court found that he was a "person" in
his official capacity, such that § 1983 liability attached if the other elements of
the statute were met.12 The court then addressed the plaintiffs claim that an
unreasonable seizure occurred in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 123
Applying the "means intentionally applied" test, the court found that no seizure
took place because "mere pursuit of a fleeing suspect, absent physical force"
does not rise to the level of a seizure.124 Further, the officer only made a "show
of authority" through lights and sirens; the driver of the motorcycle caused the
accident through his own recklessness.
Ultimately, the South Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment to the
defendants, the deputy and the officer. 126
2.

FourteenthAmendment

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."l27 The

116. See id. at 111-13, 417 S.E.2d at 524 25 (citations omitted).
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
118. See Cone, 308 S.C. at 1 12, 419 S.E.2d at 525. The court also discussed Will v. fichigan
Dep't of State Police, in which the United States Supreme Court held that "neither the state, nor a
state official acting in an official capacity, are 'persons' within § 1983." Id. at 111-12. 419 S.E.2d
at 524 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58. 71 (1989)).
119. Cone, 308 S.C. at 112, 417 S.E.2d at 525 (citing S.C. CONST. art. V, § 24; Gulledge v.
Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947, 954 (D.S.C. 1988)).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. "[C]ity officials are 'persons' within § 1983." Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n1.55 (1978)).
123. See id. at 113, 417 S.E.2d at 525 (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621. 626
(1991); Brower v. Cnty. of Invo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 97 (1989); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 16
(1968); Patterson v. City of Joplin, 878 F.2d 262, 263 (8th Cir. 1989)).
124. Id. (citing HodariD., 499 U.S. at 626).
125. See id. (citing HodariD., 499 U.S. at 626). The court also made a point of noting that the
officer testified that he had terminated the pursuit prior to the crash because the fleeing motorcycle
drove out of the county. See id. at n.4.
126. See id. at 114. 417 S.E.2d at 526.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process serves as the
basis for many § 1983 claims.1 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adopted the
"shocks the conscience" standard for substantive due process violations inder
the Fourteenth Amendment.129
In Temkin v. Frederick County
Commissioners,1 3 during a high-speed police pursuit, the fleeing driver lost
control and struck an innocent driver's vehicle.
In turn, this collision caused
the deputy sheriff in pursuit to collide with the innocent victim's car on the
driver's side, which led to the victim's debilitating injuries. 132 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's application of the shocks the
conscience standard and found that this standard was in accord with other
circuits and Fourth Circuit precedent.
The Fourth Circuit found the officer's conduct did not shock the conscience
of the court,14 even though the officer pursued the vehicle for spinning tires at a
gas station, followed too closely at speeds ranging from 65 to 105 miles per
hour, and continued the pursuit through an area of town where a carnival took
place and cars were parked on both sides of the road.13 The court held that the
officer's conduct, "while disturbing and lacking in judgment, [fell] short of the
'shocks the conscience' standard."
In 1998, seven years after Temkin, the United States Supreme Court changed
the face of police liability under the Fourteenth Amendment and imposed a strict
standard that still stands today.11 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court
adopted the shocks the conscience standard for substantive due process
violations under § 1983.
In County ofSacramento v. Lewis, police pursued
a motorcycle carrying a sixteen-year-old passenger at speeds of up to 100 miles
per hour through a residential neighborhood.140 The police followed the
motorcycle "at a distance as short as 100 feet; at that speed, [the officer's] car

128. See generally Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis. 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998) (citing Zinermon
v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990)) ("[S]ubstantive due process violations are actionable under

§ 1983.").
129. See Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991).
130. 945 F.2d 716.
131. See id. at718.
132. See id
133. See id. at 719-23 (citations omitted). The court further noted that "conduct which
'shocks the conscience.' or conduct which 'amount[s] to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official
power literally shocking to the conscience,' violates the substantive guarantees of the Due Process
Clause," regardless of the availability of remedies through state law. Id. at 720 (alteration in
original) (quoting Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952); Hall ex rel. Hall v. Tawney, 621
F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980)).
134. See id at 723.
135. See id. at 718.
136. Id. at 723.
137. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998).
138. See id
139. 523 U.S. 833.
140. See id. at 836-37.
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would have required 650 feet to stop."i 41 The motorcycle fell over during the
pursuit, and one of the chasing officers could not stop before running into the
sixteen-year-old passenger of the motorcycle.1 42 This collision caused the young
boy to be thrown seventy feet down the road, and he died from the massive
injuries he sustained due to the officer running him over.
The boy's parents brought a § 1983 action against Sacramento County, the
Sheriffs Department, and the officer, alleging that the boy's Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right to life had been violated. 144 The
district court granted summary judgment to all the defendant parties.145 As to the
officer, the district court reasoned that no opinion rendered before the accident
recognized a substantive due process right for injuries from high-speed police
pursuits.146 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding and applied a
different standard of "deliberate indifference to, or reckless disregard for, a
person's right to life and personal security."7 The court of appeals found that
this lack of standard raised a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary
judgment. 148
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court recognized generally the right
to claim violations of substantive due process ensured by the Fourteenth
Amendment in a § 1983 action. 149 The Court thoroughly analyzed previous case
law and determined that a sliding scale of culpability exists within the shocks the
conscience standard.1o At the lowest end of the spectrum is negligence because
the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee due care by police officers.151
The middle level of the scale is more than negligence but less than gross
negligence. I The Supreme Court stated that there are certain instances where

141. Id. at 837.
142. See id
143. See id. One commenter interestingly noted that prior to the release of the Lewis decision,
"[o]ne morning next spring, the nine justices of the U.S. Supreme Court will file from behind the
velvet curtain and announce their decision in Lewis v. Sacramento County. There is a virtual
statistical certainty that later the same day, someone in the United States will die in a high speed
vehicular pursuit.' M. Amanda Racines, Note, To Chase or Not to Chase: Wihat "Shocks the
Conscience" in High-Speed Police Pursuits?-County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833
(1998), 73 TEMP. L. REV. 413, 413 (2000) (quoting Michael Avery, Police Chases: fore Deadly
Than a Speeding Bullet?, TRIAL, Dec. 1997, at 52, 52).

144. See Lewis. 523 U.S. at 837.
145. See id. at 837. 838 n.2.
146. See id at 837 38 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 838 (quoting Lewis v. Sacramento Cnty., 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1996))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
148. See id at 838-39 (citing Lewis, 98 F.3d at 442).
149. See id. at 854. However, the Court further explained that "high-speed chases with no
intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not give rise to liability under
the Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under § 1983." Id.
150. See id at 845-55 (citations omitted).
151. See id. at 849 ("[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the
threshold of constitutional due process.").
152. See id. (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986)).
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this middle-of-the-spectrum approach may be actionable under § 1983 but that
The
these actionable instances deal with pretrial detainees and prisoners.15
highest level of the shocks the conscience scale involves "the most egregious
official conduct'"1 5 4 "brutal and offensive"' 5 5 conduct. and conduct that
"interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'l56
The Supreme Court then turned to police pursuits and adopted a requirement
of an intent to harm because high-speed police pursuits involve "unforeseen
circumstances demand[ing] an officer's instant judgment, even precipitate
recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the shock."1 5 7
Applying this requirement of intent to harm in order to "shock the conscience."
the Supreme Court found that the officer in Lewis did nothing to cause the
reckless driving or the accident that ensued.1 8 The Court reasoned that the
officer's reaction was grounded in his instinct to perform his job and not in intent
to kill or harm the passenger of the motorcycle.' 9 The Court's reasoning infers
two key points about the shocks the conscience standard. First, the court looks at
intent objectively, not subjectively.160 Second, the action must shock the court's
conscience, not the conscience of the public or a reasonable person.1
Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that the officer's conduct did not rise to the
level of shocking the conscience for the § 1983 action.162
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND FEDERAL LAW: AN UNJUST
BURDEN

4. Effect of Current Case Law and the South CarolinaTort Claims,4ct
An analysis of relevant case law leads to the conclusion that an innocent
bystander harmed as a result of a high-speed police chase faces two realities.
First, the United States Supreme Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis and
Brower v. County of Inyo, essentially foreclosed recovery for damages that

153. See id. at 849-50 (citing City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).
154. Id. at 846 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
155. Id. at 847 (quoting Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957)).
156. Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
157. Id. at 853-54 (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332).
158. See id. at 855.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 856 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I join the opinion of the Court. and write this
explanation of the objective character of our substantive due process analysis."). Justice Kennedy
also noted that the phrase "shocks the conscience" "has the unfortunate connotation of a standard
laden with subjective assessments. In that respect, it must be viewed with considerable skepticism."
Id. at 857.
161. See id. at 850 (majority opinion) ("Deliberate indifference that shocks in one
environment may not be so patently egregious in another, and [the court's] concern with preserving
the constitutional proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of
circumstances before any abuse of power is condemned as conscience shocking.").
162. See id. at 855.
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innocent bystanders incur as a result of police pursuits.163 Second, even if the
bystander can prove gross negligence in a state law claim, the South Carolina
Tort Claims Act will limit his recovery to $300,000.164 The chilling effect of
these two realities is that an innocent bystander injured or killed by police
officers during a pursuit will not be able to recover more than $300,000 in nearly
every situation. An analysis of current law reveals that this subset of the
population is left without an adequate remedy to compensate their losses.
This conclusion should itself "shock the conscience" because it leads to the
understanding that a fleeing felon who is harmed during a police pursuit will
likely be able to recover in situations where an innocent bystander cannot.
Under South Carolina law, the result would be the same $300,000 statutory cap;
however, in a § 1983 action, the fleeing felon has an easier time proving the
requisite intent of the officer tinder the Brower "means intentionally applied"
test.165
B.

The Intent Requirement

Although gross negligence is the standard for South Carolina state law
claims,166 a showing of intent would likely rise to that level. Under federal law,
a showing of intent prevents foreclosure of the § 1983 claim. 167 Both Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims require some showing of proof of intent in highspeed police pursuits to have a cognizable § 1983 action as set forth in Brower1 6 8
and Lewis.169 However, an objective view of intent leads to the conclusion that
in almost every case, an officer does not have the intent to harm or seize an
innocent bystander.
The term "intent" has a variety of uses and meanings in our legal system. 170
The intent required for intentional tortious conduct can be implied or
transferred.1 7 1 Also, criminal intent required for many crimes can be presumed

163. See id.: Brower v. Cnty. oflnyo. 489 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1989).
164. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a) (2005).
165. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97.
166. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-97 (creating the "means intentionally applied"
standard for § 1983 claims in relation to seizures).
168. See id. at 599 ("It was enough here, therefore, that, according to the allegations of the
complaint, Brover was meant to be stopped by the physical obstacle of the roadblock. . ..
169. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833. 855 (1998).
170. See generally BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 881-82 (9th ed. 2009) (providing definitions
for varying types of "intent").
171. See generally id. at 882 (defining implied intent as "[a] person's state of mind that can be
inferred from speech or conduct. . ." and defining transferred intent as "[i]ntent that the law may
shift from ain originally intended wrongful act to a wrongful act actually committed"). The
transferred-intent doctrine is "[t]he rule that if one person intends to harm a second person but
instead unintentionally harms a third, the first person's criminal or tortious intent toward the second
applies to the third as well." Id. at 1636.
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and transferred.
The United States Supreme Court's standards of intent and
conscience-shocking in police pursuit liability differ from state court standards
of liability for police pursuits. 3 The tests imposed on innocent bystanders for
intent lead to the conclusion, albeit not explicitly stated, that the Supreme Court
approaches such cases with a presumption that intent does not exist.14 This
presumption that intent is lacking, together with the other burdens an innocent
bystander must shoulder, has created a basic foreclosure of federal claims under
§ 1983 for these victims of police pursuits.
C. The Sliding Scale ofLiability in State Law Claims:A Conundrum for the
Courts
South Carolina adopted the gross negligence standard in state law claims of
police pursuit liability in Clark v. South Carolina Department of Public
Safety; however, the standard has not always been that of gross negligence.
Until 1990, section 56-5-760 of the South Carolina Code required reckless
disregard of public safety before police officers could be held liable for conduct
involving the operation of their patrol cars.
Across the country, a sliding scale of culpability has developed in the
context of police pursuit liability and innocent bystanders.
This scale ranges
from almost absolute immunity to almost absolute liability.179 It includes

172. See. e L. State v. Fennell, 340 S.C. 266, 272, 531 S.E.2d 512, 515 (2000) ("Although the
defendant did not act with malice toward the unintended victim. the defendant's criminal intent to
kill the intended victim ... is transferred to the unintended victim."); State v. Pinckney, 339 S.C.
346, 349, 529 S.E.2d 526. 527 (2000) (finding that for the burglary statute's requirement of intent to
be satisfied, actions after entering the house can be evidence of intent to commit a crime therein).
173. Compare Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855 (shocks the conscience standard for innocent
bystanders), and Browier, 489 U.S. at 597 ("means intentionally applied" test for those fleeing the
police), with Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety. 362 S.C. 377, 382, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2005)
(gross negligence standard).
174. In Brower, the Supreme Court noted that the police only sought to stop the suspect by a
means" of a show of authority. such as flashing lights. See Brower. 489 U.S. at 597. The means"
that actually stopped the vehicle were of the fleeing driver's own doing. See id. This analysis
implies that officers must take action further than just chasing the vehicle. See id. (stating,
hypothetically that "[i]f... the police cruiser had pulled alongside the tleeing car and sideswiped
it, then the termination of the suspect's freedom of movement would have been a seizure").
175. See Clark. 362 S.C. at 382. 608 S.E.2d at 576.
176. See Jones v. Way, 278 S.C. 295. 295. 294 S.E.2d 432, 432 (1982) (citing S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-5-760 (1976) (amended 1990)) ("[The South Carolina code] absolves the driver of an
authorized emergency vehicle from negligence, and imposes liability only when the conduct
becomes reckless.").
177. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-760 (Supp. 1977) (amended 1990); see also Act of June I I
1990, No. 580, 1990 S.C. Acts 2467 (repealing the phrase "nor shall such provisions protect the
driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard of others").
178. See generallY 'C onnor & Nor'se supra note 12. for a mrore. detaile-d disussion oP a
"continuum" of liablity in State aw claims.
179. Compare CAL. VEH. CODE § 17004 (West 2000) (absolute immunity), with NEB. REV.
STAT. § 13-911(1) (2007) (no immunity).
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reckless disregard, gross negligence, and negligence standards as well. 80 A
clear consensus does not exist as to which standard should be applied.
California is on the extreme end of the scale towards absolute immunity.
The California legislature enacted section 17004 of the Vehicle Code in 1959,181
and it has since been amended on only one occasion.
This statute forecloses
recovery by innocent bystanders, stating in relevant part that "[a]n [officer] is not
liable for civil damages on account of personal injury to or death of any
person ... when in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
the law." 18 Other states adopted a similar almost absolute immunity standard. 184
Georgia also created an exception to the waiver of immunity for "method[s] of
law enforcement" and interpreted that terminology to include vehicle pursuits. 185
The next standard on the sliding scale is reckless disregard. Several states
adhere to the reckless disre ard standard that was once a part of South Carolina
law; for example, Kansas, lowa, New York, Mississippi,18 Oklahoma, 90
and Rhode Island.191 Factors that are often cited as determining recklessness in a
police pursuit involve the length of the chase, departmental policy, need for
apprehension, and danger to the public. 192
In the middle of the scale is gross negligence. North Carolina has adopted a
gross negligence standard similar to South Carolina's. In Eckard v. Smith, 93 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals found that "in any civil action resulting from
the vehicular pursuit of a law violator, the gross negligence standard applies in

180. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11 -46-9(c) (2012) (reckless disregard); see also, e.g., Clark
v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety 362 S.C. 377, 382, 608 S.E.2d 573, 576 (2005) (gross negligence).
181. 1959 Cal. Stat. 1653.
182. See 1965 Cal. Stat. 3620.
183. § 17004.
Additionally, section 17004.7 provides immunity for public agencies
employing police officers that have a written policy for training in police pursuits. See
§ 17004.7(b).
184. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2 (West 2006) (stating that "n]either a public entity nor
a public employee is liable for ... any injury resulting from or caused by a law enforcement
officer's pursuit of a person").
185. See Blackston v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety. 618 S.E.2d 78, 79-80 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting Hilson v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 512 S.E.2d 910, 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)) (holding that a
patrolman is not liable for injuries to ain innocent bystander sustained during a vehicle pursuit and
that "[c]hasing a speeding vehicle is a method of law enforcement subject to exception under
Georgia law").
186. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1506(d) (2001).
187. See IOWA CODE § 321.231 (Supp. 2012).
188. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1104(e) (McKinney 2011).
189. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(c) (2012).
190. See State ex rel Okla. Dep't ofPub. Safety v. Gurich, 238 P.3d 1, 8 (Okla. 2010).
191. R.I. GEN. LAWS §31-12-9 (2010).
192. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cleveland, 846 So. 2d 1031, 1037 (Miss. 2003) (citing City
of Jackson v. Brister, 838 So. 2d 274, 280 (Miss. 2003): City of Jackson v. Lipsey. 834 So. 2d 687.
692 93 (Miss. 2003); City of Jackson v. Perry, 764 So. 2d 373, 377 (Miss. 2000). Maye v. Pearl
River Cnty., 758 So. 2d 391, 395 (Miss. 1999)) (listing these factors as ones to be considered to
determine if police act with reckless disregard).
193. 603 S.E-2d 1 4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
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determining the officer's liability." 94 Other jurisdictions that have adopted the
gross negli ence standard include North Dakota195 and the District of
Columbia.
At the lower end of the sliding scale of culpability is ordinary negligence.
This standard is the same as ordinary tort liability and gives the officer the least
protection available without statutory action. 197 Far fewer courts have adopted
this standard over gross negligence, reckless disregard, or discretionary
immunity. 1
Nebraska is one of the few states that statutorily confers no
immunity for police officers that harm innocent bystanders in a high-speed
police chase. 199
V. CHASTNG CHANGE: SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM TN SOUTi CAROLINA

South Carolina courts and the General Assembly could take three different
avenues to cure this unjust remedy imposed on innocent bystanders. First, the
South Carolina General Assembly can amend the Tort Claims Act to resemble
Nebraska Revised Statute section 13-911. Nebraska's statute on vehicular
pursuit by law enforcement officers states that "[i]n case of death, injury ... to
any innocent third party proximately caused by the action of a law enforcement
officer employed by a political subdivision during a vehicular pursuit, damages
shall be aid to such third party by the political subdivision employing the
officer."2
A similar statute in South Carolina would provide the most just conditions
for innocent bystanders to fully recover for their losses in police pursuits. It
would circumvent the numerous standards federal law imposes and the question
of which standard of culpability to impose on the sliding scale. Courts would
have to turn no further than the statute to determine liability, and the question

194. Id. at 138 (quoting Parish v. Hill, 513 S.E.2d 547, 551 (N.C. 1999)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
195. See Jones v. Ahlberg, 489 N.W.2d 576, 581 (N.D. 1992).
196. See D.C. CODE § 2-412 (LexisNexis 2001).
197. See generally O'Connor & Norse, supra note 12, at 528 29 (citing NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 13-911 (1987); Henery v. City of Omaha. 641 N.W.2d 644, 646-49 (Neb. 2002)) (requiring only
proximate cause for liability and noting that the "proximate cause standard is not difficult to
achieve").
198. See generally id. (citing § 13-911;- Henery, 641 N.W.2d at 646-49) (describing only
Nebraska as having a statute of this kind and stating that it is the "most plaintiff favorable state").
199. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-911(1) (2007).
200. Id. This statute confers strict liability on the political agency that employs the officers
who participate in the pursuit and the pursuit proximately causes an innocent bystander injury or
death. See Staley v. City of Omaha, 713 N.W.2d 457. 465. 470-71 (Neb. 2006) (citing Stewart v.
City of Omaha, 494 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Neb. 1993), disapproved of by Henery, 641 N.W.2d at 644)
(holding that the lower court did not err in finding ain innocent bystander's injuries were
proximately caused by the non-negligent actions of a police officer in a vehicle pursuit and
upholding a jury verdict of $1 million against the City of Omaha).
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would then only turn on the amount of recovery.201 Such a statute would lessen
the hardships and burdens carried by this class of victims, who currently have no
avenue of proper relief in the courts. The statute also could be written to allow
the political subdivision to be reimbursed for damages paid to the innocent
bystander.202 Police pursuits are dangerous, no matter the conditions that
surround them, and innocent bystanders should not be forced to bear the cost of
their injuries caused by these dangerous activities.
In the alternative of enacting an innocent-bystander statute, the South
Carolina Supreme Court should shift the standard from gross negligence to
ordinary negligence. In Clark v. South CarolinaDepartment of Public Safety,
the sole case on this issue in South Carolina, the officer faced forced termination
of the pursuit, despite the need to apprehend the vehicle because the vehicle was
five miles from leaving the state's jurisdiction.203 In most instances where
innocent bystanders are harmed in police pursuits, this gross negligence standard
will be difficult to meet. The Clark case is an exception, rather than an ordinary
occurrence. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act states that government entities
are liable for their torts in the same manner as average citizens.204 In the same
vein as the innocent-bystander statute, counties and municipalities should not be
able to deny recovery to people harmed as a consequence of the actions taken by
the government's employees.
In addition to the above suggestions, regardless of which action is taken, if
any, the South Carolina Tort Claims Act should be amended to raise the statutory
cap or provide for equitable allowances for innocent bystanders. The current cap
of $300,000 is particularly low when viewed in the context of the loss of a loved
one or a lifetime of medical care as a result of debilitating injuries. 20 In many
cases, the amount awarded will go to reimburse insurance companies, in whole

201. However, "innocent bystanders" will need to be defined at the outset, or the courts will
face issues about whether passengers in fleeing vehicles are innocent. The Nebraska Supreme
Court noted that a passenger may qualify as an innocent bystander under the statute if "[he] has not
promoted, provoked, or persuaded the driver to engage in flight from law enforcement personnel
and one who is not sought to be apprehended in the fleeing vehicle." Henery, 641 N.W.2d at 649.
202. See, e.g., § 13-911(2) (allowing for reimbursement by the political subdivision from the
driver of the fleeing vehicle, insurers of the driver, any company or organization liable for the
driver's conduct, insurers of the company or organization, any political subdivision whose officers
contributed to the proximate cause of the accident, and other sources).
203. See Clark v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 362 S.C. 377, 383-84, 608 S.E.2d 573, 577
(2005) (involving a lengthy and dangerous police pursuit that resulted in the death of an innocent
bystander when the fleeing felon's vehicle collided head-on with Clark's vehicle).
204. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (2005).
205. Cf GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-29 (2009) (providing a $1 million dollar statutory cap for
claims under the Georgia Tort Claims Act); VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-195.3 (2007) (providing a
statutory cap of $100,000 or "the maximum hinits of any liability policy maintained ... wvhichever
is greater").
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or in part, for medical expenses. 206 The innocent bystander very well may walk
away with nothing but scars and a traumatic memory, should he be that lucky.
Equitable allowances, such as grievous injury or death as a result of police
pursuits, should be built into the Tort Claims Act. It should not be a bright line
that can never be crossed.
VI. CONCLUSION

Under current South Carolina and federal law, it is easier and more probable
for a fleeing suspect who was harmed in a police pursuit to recover than it is for
an innocent bystander to receive complete or partial recovery.207 The South
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Clark established the gross negligence
standard of liability in South Carolina, 208 but this case still does not provide the
standard necessary to afford innocent bystanders total relief.09 While the need
for effective law enforcement and the desire to not let criminals run free are
strong and compelling governmental interests, they should not be enshrined at
the expense of innocent bystanders. Society should not ask this class of
individuals to bear the burden of medical costs or the loss of a loved one simply
because it was necessary to catch the traffic-law offender.
As a nation, the United States has not accepted the notion that the need for
more efficient law enforcement justifies the expense of infringing on the rights
of individuals. The right to an adequate remedy is one that should not be denied
to this subset of the population. Therefore, South Carolina courts and the
General Assembly should take affirmative steps to ensure that innocent
bystanders are able to obtain a just remedy, instead of the unjust one available
today.
Bonnie E. Bull

206. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-190 (2002) (allowing for insurance contracts to
provide for subrogation by the insurer to amounts the insured recovers from liable third parties).
207. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
208. Clark 362 S.C. at 382, 608 S.E.2d at 576.
209. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
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